Abstract-We present Knock Yourself Out (KYO), a password generator that enables secure authentication against a computationally unbounded adversary. Master passwords can be surprisingly short and may be re-used for multiple service accounts even in the event of client compromises and multiple server compromises. At the same time, KYO is transparent to service operators and backwards-compatible. Master passwords are fully client-manageable while secrets shared with service operators can be kept constant. Likewise, secrets can be changed without having to change one's passwords. KYO does not rely on collision-resistant hash functions and can be implemented with fast non-cryptographic hash functions. We detail the design of KYO and we analyze its security mathematically in a random hash function model. In our empirical evaluation we find that KYO remains secure even if small sets of hash functions are used instead, in other words, KYO requires minimal storage and is highly practical.
I. INTRODUCTION Authenticating oneself to another party over a computer network is a fundamental security goal, and passwords are a pervasive mechanism to accomplish that goal. Passwords steadfastly resist being outmoded by other authentication technologies even though they are associated with bad security and bad usability. Common wisdom says that users must choose long passwords randomly for best security. Furthermore, users must not re-use passwords across different services or else one breach of a service may leak passwords that adversaries use to breach additional accounts. This is a realistic threat as the public press can testify. However, users cannot remember reliably many different secure passwords because of a variety of cognitive limitations and hence they tend to engage in insecure password practices. For example Florenĉio et al. [9] found that the average password is used at 4 sites. Bonneau and Preibusch [5] pointed out that after apparent improvements in password quality between the 70's and 90's, the web appears to have altered that trend again for worse.
In our paper, we propose means to significantly enhance the security and usability of password security mechanisms against security breaches. Specifically, we address the following two risks associated with password mechanisms simultaneously.
1) An adversary obtains a copy of a user's personal password database and uses the information to log into that user's accounts. We call this a client breach. 2) An adversary obtains a copy of a server's password database and uses the information to log into accounts on other servers. We call this a server breach.
As this is done in related work (see section VII), we assume that the integrity of clients and servers has not been compromised, for example, by installing a key logger that intercepts entry of a master password. We do not address the risk that an adversary obtains a copy of a server's password database and uses the information to log into accounts on that same server. Instead, we discuss in Section VII how related work attempts to mitigate this risk under varying assumptions and how they blend with our proposals.
Existing work has addressed client breaches and server breaches largely in isolation, sometimes using similar mechanisms. For example, decoy passwords have been proposed as a means to trigger false login detection at servers in the case of client [4] and server [14] breaches. Although, no work we are aware of has addressed the case that passwords are shared among accounts and multiple password databases are breached. For example, intersecting two databases with decoy passwords quickly reveals all shared passwords and filters out decoys with high probability. This yields passwords that adversaries can potentially use to log onto first-party servers (breached) and third-party servers (not breached). Furthermore, the protection mechanisms proposed thus far have notable costs associated with them, for example, increased memory requirements [4] , [14] , [7] , increased interactions and login latency [16] , delayed verification [6] and varying amounts of required server changes [14] , [16] , [6] . Even key stretching [15] consumes energy that largely goes to waste, which is a best practice most password mechanism rely on in order to counter offline attacks. Lastly, none of these proposals introduce more user-friendly password choices.
In this paper, we propose Knock Yourself Out (KYO), a novel client-side password generator mechanism that mitigates the risks of simultaneous breaches of clients and multiple servers. The master password can be as short as four characters, and 10 characters if security against the breach of the password client and three servers is desired. Passwords can be re-used, that is, a client need only remember one master password. At the same time, KYO is fully client-manageable, that is, server-specific secrets can be changed without changing the master password, and the master password can be changed without affecting server secrets. KYO incurs no additional costs over naïve state of the art password mechanisms and it can be instantiated with fast non-cryptographic hash functions and without key stretching. We prove KYO secure in an informationtheoretic setting, that is, in a random hash function model against unbounded adversaries. KYO is backwards-compatible with existing server implementations. In order to achieve its best security and usability product, KYO requires that servers are configured to lock accounts upon the first false login attempt. KYO verifies passwords locally and prevents false logins.
In what follows, we further detail our assumptions and threat model, followed by an overview over KYO's design, properties and features. Subsequently, we evaluate KYO mathematically in a random hash function model and we briefly point out the impact of moving from a random hash function to smaller sets of functions. In our subsequent empirical exploration, we find that even small sets of functions exhibit the necessary and sufficient properties we require. Based on our theoretical analysis, we estimate the salient properties of KYO, for example, the relationships between password length and the number of client and server breaches against which passwords shall be secure. We discuss obvious and less obvious application areas for KYO, compare KYO to related work and end with conclusions and an outlook of what kind of future work we deem most exciting.
II. ASSUMPTIONS AND THREAT MODEL
For ease of description we assume throughout the paper that Alice communicates with Bob, Carol and David. One may think of Alice as a user with a client computer, and of Bob, Carol and Dave as servers. Alice shares a secret with Bob, and another one with Carol, and another one with David. KYO allows Alice to generate all of her shared secrets based on a single password, if she so desires. For the sake of generality, we consider the scenario that Alice wishes to use one password for Bob and a different one for Carol and David. More formally, let ρ 1 , ρ 2 be Alice's passwords, let γ 1 . . . , γ 3 be the secrets that Alice shares with the other parties and let σ A→B be a seed Alice uses to generate the secret she shares with Bob. Let F be the generator function, then:
This will be our running example. Alice authenticates herself to Bob by presenting γ 1 to Bob in a fashion that assures that the presentation is fresh and that γ 1 is not revealed to outside parties. In practice, Alice may connect to Bob using a TLS connection, Bob authenticates itself to Alice based on a valid X.509v3 certificate, and Alice transmits her shared secret to Bob in order to authenticate herself to Bob. All parties store their seeds and corresponding identities.
A. Power of the adversary
The adversary may compromise any number of the parties, for example, Alice, Bob and Carol. We assume that none of the compromised parties store their passwords, and that they do not enter their passwords following a compromise. This means that, for example, the adversary learns all secrets Bob shares with Alice, and all seeds Alice stores, but not the password of Alice. Furthermore, we assume that the adversary is computationally unbounded, that is, he can compute as much as he likes.
The risks we outlined encompass a wide variety of actual risks to which Alice may expose herself. For example: Alice looses her laptop, someone seizes or steals her laptop, or someone compromises one or multiple services that Alice uses and steals any available secret information on the users of the service.
B. Security and safety objectives
We say that an adversary succeeds if he authenticates himself as Alice to an uncompromised party. Depending on which parties the adversary compromises and how many of them, we seek to make statements of the form the success probability of the adversary is , where is a concrete probability based on some choice of security parameters. We will call the probability insecurity and accordingly 1 − security.
In an analoguous fashion, we wish to make statements about the safety of password entry. Jumping slightly ahead, KYO verifies correct password entry locally. Therefore, one might assume that Alice, the user, has an infinite number of tries and, consequently, Bob will never lock out Alice because Alice only submits correct secrets to him. However, if Alice has an infinite number of tries then an adversary who breaches the client can brute-force the mechanism offline. Since we wish to provide security against client breaches, we cannot allow this to happen. For this reason, KYO takes a different approach and as a consequence there exists a probability δ with which KYO accepts a false password as correct. In this case, KYO will produce a wrong secret and Bob will lock Alice out. Hence, security determines an upper bound on safety. In our mathematical analysis, we show how to control and δ. In our writing, we refer to δ as insafety and to 1 − δ as safety.
C. Baseline security
Eventually, we must choose concrete parameters and these parameters determine the actual security and safety of KYO and the necessary lengths of passwords. We want our passwords to be as short as possible without sacrificing security and safety. Hence the question arises what are acceptable levels of security and safety. Towards guidance we look at the security of ATM machines. It is probably safe to assume that the risk of unauthorized access to one's bank account is an acceptable baseline. We further assume that the adversary is in possession of a banking card and hence the remaining security lies in the PIN. ATMs typically limit the number of invalid PIN entries to two so that a user has three attempts to enter the correct PIN. Conservatively, we assume that the PIN number is chosen uniformly at random from the set {0, . . . , 9} 4 and hence there are N = 10 4 equally likely PINs. The failure probability of guessing a particular PIN in n tries is then given by the hypergeometric distribution
, which simplifies to 1 − n · 10 −4 . Thus for three allowed PIN entries the insecurity of this scheme is 3 · 10 −4 . Since ATM machines are in widespread use, we believe 3 · 10 −4 to be a reasonable baseline for insecurity. Likewise, it is probably fair to argue that, most of the time, a security breach in this scenario is a more serious event than a lockout. From this we conclude that the security bound is suitable as a bound for safety as well.
D. Residual risks and attacks
We have mentioned before that KYO performs best if servers lock an account immediately if the client provides a false secret. This poses a denial of service risk. Actually, this risk exists in any password system that tolerates only a low constant number of false logins. A second risk is that an adversary succeeds simply by fixing a random password and by trying this password on a large number of user accounts. If a server has a large number of users then with a good probability, the adversary will breach some accounts. Again, this is a risk that applies to password systems in general. Although, the risk is somewhat higher in the case of KYO because KYO uses short secrets in addition to short passwords. Short secrets have other security benefits, as we discuss in following sections. Fortunately, there is a general solution that mitigates the two risks we just mentioned. Randomizing users' identities forces the adversary to guess matching user identities and passwords. Hence, we can augment n bits of password entropy with an arbitrary entropy m from user identities for a total of n + m bits. Florenĉio et al. [10] discuss this approach nicely in a paper of theirs and therefore we assume henceforth that the problem is solved adequately. We discuss another similar solution in Section VI to make KYO backwards compatible with existing systems.
III. DESIGN
A contemporary password check fulfils two goals. First, it verifies that Alice entered her password correctly, and second, it verifies that the entered password is authentic. The former is a safety check (that the password was entered correctly) and the latter is a security check (it matches the one associated with the user account). If the server verifies both safety and security, this distinction seems artificial since the response is typically the same in both cases (for example, a prompt to re-enter one's password). It does not make sense to distinguish between them. In the case of our password generator schemes there is a distinction, however, because Alice checks her password ρ 1 locally for correctness, and Bob stops accepting communication from Alice immediately if Alice presents anything but γ A→B as her secret. In order to prevent this from happening when she enters a wrong password, Alice uses an error detecting code in order to check passwords for correctness locally. This code will however detect only a fraction of all possible false password entries.
Towards an understanding of the principles that underpin our KYO password generator, consider a function F σ that partitions the set of all hexadecimal passwords of length four into eight evenly sized subsets as indicated in Figure 1 . For example, F σ maps the password (48D3) 16 to the subset (001) 2 . We use the output of F as the error correction information and store it locally on a computer. Assume that F σ maps passwords randomly to each subset. It follows that the probability that any password is in subset (001) 2 is 1/8. The safety of F is therefore the probability that a password other than (48D3) 16 is not in that same subset, which is 1 − 1/8 = 0.875. Assuming that passwords are chosen uniformly at random, each subset contains (16 4 /2 3 ) = 8192 equally likely passwords. Therefore, the security of F against an attacker with knowledge of F and the subset (001) 2 is 1 − 1/8192 ≈ 0.9999, even if the adversary is unbounded.
There is a small catch, though. If Alice enters her password incorrectly multiple times and her entries are pair-wise different then safety decreases because the remaining number of incorrect passwords not mapped to (001) 2 decreases compared to the number of incorrect passwords mapped to (001) 2 . This effect compounds over multiple authentication sessions unless Alice always makes the same errors. Therefore, KYO chooses a new seed σ each time Alice enters her password correctly. This renders authentication sessions independent of each other and improves safety. In what follows, we explore these ideas further. Particularly, we will use two instances of the sketched function F , one for checking safety and another one to generate secrets.
A. KYO families
We require functions with certain properties for KYO. In this section, we define these requirements. We begin by introducing necessary terminology. Towards this end, let S = {0, 1}
n , L = {0, 1} with s ≥ n > be sets and let (F σ ) σ∈S be a family of hash functions with
We call ρ ∈ P password and σ ∈ S seed. We call γ ∈ L (shared) secret if it is used for authentication purposes, or digest if it is used for error detection. If there is no need for a distinction between these two cases then we use the term digest for both. Note that since we require that n > , F σ will be a lossy function, that is, non-injective. Unless noted otherwise, whenever we say that some element is chosen randomly from some set, we mean that it is chosen uniformly at random from that set and independent from any other values that might be chosen from the same set at the same time. Requirement 1 (Password selection). Given arbitrary passwords ρ 1 , . . . , ρ N ∈ P , seeds σ 1 , . . . , σ N ∈ S and digests
Requirement 2 (Seed selection 1). Given arbitrary passwords ρ, ρ 1 , . . . , ρ N ∈ P , there exists a seed σ ∈ S with
Requirement 3 (Seed selection 2). Given an arbitrary password ρ ∈ P and a shared secret γ ∈ L, there exists a seed σ ∈ S with F σ (ρ) = γ.
We also require that there exist algorithms that compute passwords and seeds according to these requirements. We do not require that these algorithms are efficient in a complexitytheoretic sense but instead that running them is feasible for practical choices of parameters. In Section IV-A, we show that random sampling computes passwords and seeds with high probability.
B. Data structures
The KYO password generator manages and generates secrets based on a password table PW and an address book table T, see Figure 2 for illustration. The password table keeps error detection information on passwords, that is, a seed and digest for each password. The address book contains records that name the recipient (for example, a server), the index of the associated password record in the password table, and a seed specific to that recipient and the associated password. In what follows, we describe how KYO implements common operations such as verifying passwords, computing secrets, adding and removing accounts, adding and changing passwords, et cetera.
C. Password creation and verification
In order to create a new password entry in PW, Alice first selects a random password ρ ∈ P . If the password table PW is still empty, she then selects a random seed σ ∈ S, calculates γ := F σ (ρ) and stores (σ 1 , γ 1 ) := (σ, γ) in PW. If PW is not empty then Alice selects a random ρ ∈ P that meets requirement 1 and a random seed σ ∈ S that meets requirement 2. Next, she calculates γ := F σ (ρ) and stores (σ i , γ i ) := (σ, γ) with a fresh index i in PW. This ensures that table PW satisfies the following constraint with a high probability:
Constraint 1 (Confused passwords). Let ρ i be Alice's passwords. Table PW satisfies the confused passwords constraint iff for all i and j:
shared secret derivation else return ⊥ report error and restart
In order to verify if a password ρ is the correct password for entry i, Alice retrieves the entry (σ i , γ i ) from PW and tests whether F σi (ρ) = γ i . If so, we say that ρ verifies under (σ i , γ i ). Constraint 1 ensures that each password verifies under only one entry (σ i , γ i ) in PW, thus providing password safety.
D. Adding recipients and shared secret derivation
In order to add a recipient, say Bob, to the address book T, Alice selects a random seed σ ∈ S and chooses a password index i from PW. Alice then enters her password ρ. If ρ verifies under (σ i , γ i ) then Alice stores the entry Bob, i, σ in T. She finally transmits the shared secret γ := F σ (ρ) to Bob who will store it locally in order to verify Alice with it in the future. Figure 2 shows Alice's tables PW and T for our running example of one password for Bob and a shared one for Carol and Dave.
In order to derive a shared secret for recipient R, Alice enters a password ρ and runs Algorithm AUTH(ρ, R) in Scheme 1. Upon entering ρ, the algorithm tests if ρ verifies for recipient R. If the test fails then the algorithm fails and Alice is assumed to have entered a wrong password. If the test succeeds then the algorithms updates the corresponding entry in PW and outputs a shared secret. As we show in Section IV, the update of the entry in PW is important for the scheme's safety.
E. Changing passwords and shared secrets
Alice might want to change a secret she shares with Bob without changing her password. This is not possible with contemporary password generators but it is straightfoward in KYO. Alice selects a new random seed σ ∈ S, calculates the shared secret and informs the recipient of it's new value.
Changing one's password while keeping all shared secrets the same is more involved. Let σ i , γ i with i ∈ I be the seeds and shared secrets that are protected by password ρ (the seed is taken from table T), that is, it holds that
Alice chooses a new random password ρ ∈ P that satisfies Constraint 1. Subsequently, she must find seeds σ i ∈ S that fulfill the equation before. Requirement 3 states that it is possible to find such seed values. Once found, Alice replaces the entry in PW with (σ , F σ (ρ )) with a fresh selected seed σ ∈ S and updates the entries of T with the found seeds σ i .
In our evaluation in Section IV we show that it is not only possible to find these seeds σ i but also that doing so does not compromise security. We will call this scenario selected seeds, because a seed is "selected" to fit an independently chosen password and shared secret.
F. Managing password sharing
Alice may use the same technique to transparently manage groups, that is, the recipients for whom she uses the same password, say ρ. In order to include someone in that group with whom she shares secret γ, all she needs to do is find an additional σ so that F σ (ρ) = γ.
In order to exclude someone from a group, she simply chooses a new random password ρ that satisfies constraint 1 and finds a seed σ that satisfies F σ (ρ ) = γ. As before, Requirements 1 and 3 ensure that this is possible.
G. Synchronizing shared secrets
In what we have seen so far, Bob stores the secret γ he shares with Alice locally in order to be able to verify if a client is indeed Alice. Instead of storing the secret explicitly, Bob can protect γ using F in the same way Alice protects her secrets. In order to do so he selects a random verification password ρ v ∈ P and finds a verification seed σ v ∈ S so that F σv (ρ v ) = γ. Once found, he stores σ v in a separate column in his own address book T. The necessary Algorithm AUTH v for this is basically the same as AUTH in Scheme 1, with the symbols of seeds and digests substituted in the obvious manner. Bob runs AUTH v (ρ v , R) and accepts if the output is the same as the shared secret he received from Alice.
If Bob had a password beforehand that he uses to authenticate himself to Alice then Bob can keep his password and synchronize the secret he shared with Alice with the secret that Alice shared with him. Essentially, both Alice and Bob choose passwords and seeds that map to the same secret. In this fashion, Bob des not have to store two seeds for two secrets both shared with Alice. Since passwords and shared secrets are chosen randomly and independently of each other, this scenario is essentially the same as the selected seeds scenario and Requirement 3 ensures that it is possible to find the necessary seed values.
It is worth noting that if all participants used synchronized secrets then an adversary would not be able to impersonate anyone even if he had access to all KYO tables of everyone, as we show in our evaluation. The downside is that synchronized secrets link the security of the authentication of Bob and Alice. This means that if an adversary ever learns the secret that Alice uses to authenticate herself to Bob (for example, by breaking into their communication channel) then the adversary cannot only authenticate himself as Alice to Bob but also vice versa.
H. Summary of properties
By what we have described so far, it should be clear that Alice is free to manage groups of users for whom she can choose same or different passwords as a means of protecting shared secrets. Furthermore, Alice is free to change passwords and secrets as she pleases. Moreover, all communicating parties can synchronize their seeds so that they can choose individual passwords to manage mutually shared secrets for authentication purposes. The use of shared secrets is not limited to online communication, though. Since KYO does not require a feedback channel, communicating parties may use their shared secrets for other purposes as well, for example, for the purpose of authenticating electronic mail. It is important to note, though, that the shared secret is short by design and, hence, the authentication scheme must be designed carefully to account for this property.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section we analyze KYO mathematically based on the assumption that F is a random hash function. This implies that |S| = |L| |P | . We update our definition of KYO families from Section III-A accordingly as follows:
Definition 1 (KYO family). Let F be the set of all functions mapping P to L and let S be an index set enumerating them.
The definition implies that F σ is selected randomly from F given a random seed σ. For growing P and L, the length of a seed quickly exceeds what is feasibly processed and stored on a computer. In practice, we will therefore work with index sets that are much smaller. This is unproblematic as long as the number of recipients per password is small compared to 2 s . This is because the distribution over random samples of the indexes has the same mathematical expectation as F . Therefore, we just need "enough" indexes so that F meets the requirements we introduced in Section III-A. The analysis and the proofs are simpler in the case of a random hash function, though. We have proven corresponding lemmas and theorems for random index subsets as well but presenting them here while meeting the page limit would render the presentation unreadable.
In what follows, we show that KYO families meet the requirements we put forward in Section III-A. For ease of reading we only state the results in this section and give the proofs in Appendix A. Subsequently, we analyze the safety of KYO families followed by an analysis of the security of KYO families.
A. KYO generator properties
For a given ρ ∈ {0, 1} n and σ, ∈ {0, 1} s , we denote the set of passwords that map to γ under σ with
We now show that a KYO family meets Requirements 1 and 2 and 3 with high probability. The following lemmas state that random sampling is sufficient to achieve safety with high probability.
Lemma 1 (Password creation).
If the password table PW already contains N passwords, the number of random tries to find the (N + 1)-th password is geometrically distributed with average value
Lemma 2 (Seed selection 1). For N − 1 given passwords, a randomly chosen seed σ meets Requirement 2 with probability
that KYO does not allow unsuccessful authentication attempts, that is, an attacker has only one try to predict the target secret. If Alice re-uses the target password for N − 1 other recipients then an adversary may try to authenticate to each of them to learn information about the target password. In order to simplify this part of our analysis we assume that an adversary is then given the secrets of those N − 1 recipients. From here on, we assume that K contains the following types of information:
• The contents of Alice's address book,
• a set of passwords,
• a set of shared secrets other than the target, and • whether any shared secrets are selected.
In practice, K might include information from sources outside of our model as well, for example, partial information on the target password derived from smudges on the touch screen of a smartphone [2] . We consider these side-channels out of our scope. For the purpose of our analysis, the items above are a complete characterization of the types of information an adversary can have. Hence, by taking into account all combinations of these items, we get an exhaustive view on an adversary's success probability.
We begin by reasoning that the adversary must know a user's address book to glean information on a target secret. Assume he does not. Then he may know at most all secrets other than the target secret and he may know all passwords. The secrets yield information on their corresponding passwords but passwords only yield information on other passwords through digests in the password table. Therefore, the best the adversary can hope is to learn the target password, which we just assumed he already knows. Since F comprises all functions from P to L, there exist equally many seeds σ for any pair of ρ and γ so that F σ (ρ) = γ. This follows from a simple labeling argument. Hence, given the target password but not the target seed, all secrets are equally likely, which completes our argument.
In what follows, we assume that the adversary has obtained information from the address book table and the password table. We are left with two types of information transfers to analyze:
1) The first transfer is from secrets to passwords through the contents of the password table.
2) The second transfer is from passwords to secrets through the contents of the address book table.
Remember that the goal of the adversary is to glean information on the target secret based on at most a fixed number of other leaked secrets and information in the user's password table and address book table.
We begin with the second type of transfer. Our analytical goal is to measure the probability distribution over secrets given partial knowledge about a password. Note that the information whether the target seed is selected (as opposed to having been chosen entirely at random) does not help here since the number of seeds to choose from are the same for every password and digest combination. Therefore, we ignore selected seeds for now. The following definition models the secret guessing experiment accordingly.
Definition 4 (Guessing secrets experiment).
The secrets guessing experiment is defined by the probability space (Ω, P(Ω), Pr), with Ω := {(ρ, σ) ∈ P × S}.
In order to work with this definition we define the random variables R that gives the target password, Σ that gives the target seed and Γ the target secret. In detail, for given ρ, σ or γ:
• R = ρ denotes all events (ρ, σ) with σ ∈ S, • Σ = σ denotes all events (ρ, σ) with ρ ∈ P , and • Γ = γ denotes all events (ρ, σ) ∈ Ω with F σ (ρ) = γ.
As we will see in the next section, if an adversary learns secrets and seeds he will learn a candidate set C of passwords that are all equally likely. The next lemma gives the guessing probability with knowledge of C.
Lemma 5 (Guessing secrets). Let C be a set of equally likely candidate passwords and let c = |C|. We define M = F σ (C). Then the probability
is binomial distributed with the average value
We discuss the first type of information transfer next, that is, how an adversary may gain knowledge of a set of candidate passwords C. Specifically, we investigate what happens if the adversary learns the contents of Alice's address book and her shared secrets. We obtain results about the size of the password candidate set C and that all passwords within C are equally likely. These results and the results from Lemma 5 together yield the overall guessing probability.
Recall that in the selected seeds scenario, Alice fixes a password ρ and a secret γ i and then chooses a seed σ i so that F σi (ρ) = γ i . Let S i (ρ) denote the set from which Alice chooses the seed σ i . If Alice does not fix a secret γ i then let S i (ρ) denote the set of all seeds, that is, S i (ρ) = S. Next, we model the probability distribution over passwords if seeds and secrets are learned.
Definition 5 (Guessing passwords experiment).
The password guessing experiment is defined by the probability space (Ω, P(Ω), Pr), with
where
In addition to the random variables we have defined before (R, Σ and Γ) we need random variables Σ i and Γ i . Variable Σ i describes the seed for the i-th pair and variable Γ i describes permissible then Alice may protect herself against denial of service attacks in the following way. In addition to her secret γ, Alice shares a randomly generated token τ . She stores τ in plain text in her address book and sends τ, γ to Bob. Bob only verifies whether Alice's password is correct if the received token τ matches the one he has stored for Alice. It is easy to see that an adversary succeeds in locking out Alice only if he guesses the value τ , the probability of which is negligible in τ . Note that in this case, τ is related to safety and not security. Hence, Alice only looses denial of service protection (safety) if her Address book is disclosed.
Alice may use a similar approach to achieve backwards compatibility with servers that are oblivious to KYO, that is, servers that lock users out only after multiple failed authentication attempts (instead of one failed attempt). As before, Alice generates and stores a token τ in her address book and sends τ ||γ for authentication. Note that τ is now related to security and Alice sacrifices KYO's protection against address book loss in exchange for achieving backwards compatibility. However, KYO's protection against server-side disclosures remains intact.
Besides the obvious uses of KYO, we originally designed it to help solve a problem that arises in whistleblowing systems. Consider a whistleblower Alice who established contact with a journalist Bob and wishes to send e-mail to the journalist using an anonymous re-mailer. In order to authenticate herself to Bob, Alice encrypts a shared secret along with the message. A typing error would stall her account with Bob and hence it is desirable to check locally that the secret is the correct one. An incorrect secret would then be a giveaway that Alice is in danger. However, it might be desastrous for the whistleblower if the adversary found the secret on her computer because he could use the secret to confirm that she indeed is the whistleblower. With KYO, she can keep her secret on her computer protected with a 4 character password even if the adversary is computationally unbounded.
VII. RELATED WORK
KYO families are an exploration of ideas similar to those of collisionful hash functions [3] or collision rich hashing proposed previously to secure file checksums against manipulation [19] or to protect key exchange protocols against man-in-the-middle attacks using weak passwords [1] . KYO can be understood as an extension of collisionful hashing to password sharing and password management.
A. Server-side mechanisms
Cappos proposed PolyPassHash [6] , which is a mechanism meant to mitigate password database leaks from servers. The mechanism keeps users' salted and hashed passwords xor'ed with a per-user share. Without knowledge of a share, adversaries cannot brute-force the associated password. Shares are computed using a (k, n)-threshold scheme. The general idea is that once k users have provided their passwords, k shares can be recovered and all other shares can be computed. From this moment on, logins can be verified. In order to allow some level of password verification before the threshold is reached, Cappos suggests that each database entry leak some bits of the salted and hashed passwords.
This bears some resemblance to how KYO uses digests. However, whereas digests are a safety mechanism in KYO, they are a security mechanism in PolyPassHash. In KYO, a random digest collision results in a fail-safe lockout whereas it leads to a security breach in the case of PolyPassHash. Furthermore, adversaries can use the leaked bits to confirm suspected password re-use, for example, if they have obtained other login credentials of some users in the PolyPassHash database. This in turn allows one to recover shares. KYO, on the other hand, is designed specifically to mitigate the risks of multiple related database leaks (and client leaks).
It is worth noting that PolyPassHash can be broken by bribing at most k users into revealing their passwords after a database leak. This poses no subjective risk to users because they can change their passwords to new ones before revealing their old ones. An even easiest and cheaper attack is to open k accounts at the service before downloading the password database. This means that k passwords are known and all shares can be recovered easily. In the KYO case, password database leaks provide no information on users' passwords unless clients are breached as well, because the seeds are only on clients.
HoneyWords [14] is another mechanism to mitigate password database leaks. The server keeps k − 1 decoy passwords along with each correct one, in random order. When a user logs in, the server queries a trusted honey checker service with the user id and obtains the index of the correct password, which is used to verify the user's input. If an adversary obtains the bassword database then he has a 1/k chance to choose the right password. If he chooses a decoy then the server locks the associated account. Obviously, the decoys must be chosen so that they are not easily distinguished from the real password. However, adversaries may attempt to exclude decoys by submitting them to other services posing as the same user. If the attempt is successful then the user has very likely re-used her password. If the attempt is unsuccessful then the password might have been a decoy and the adversary tries another one.
SAuth [16] also uses decoys to mitigate password database leaks of a service. Decoys are valid alternative passwords, though. Their purpose is not to protect the breached service but to mitigate attacks on other services in cases of password re-use. If two databases are leaked then, again, password reuse is insecure. As in other decoy uses, the challenge is to generate decoys in a fashion that makes them indistinguishable from user-provided passwords. SAuth also requires that users authenticate themselves not only with a valid password but also that they log into a vouching service with the password of the vouching service. Both services must be specified beforehand and assurances must be provided that both accounts belong to the same individual. A downside is that users are inconvenienced compared to the status quo because SAuth incurs additional interaction and login delays.
Mechanisms that employ decoys typically require O(k · n) memory where n is the number of passwords and k − 1 the number of decoys. For large databases, this incurs considerable overhead. If memory is plentiful then passwords can be protected against off-line attacks in a bounded retrieval model [7] . The underlying assumption is that the password database is too large to be leaked in its entirety. KYO, on the other hand, requires O(n) memory, the size of a contemporary password database.
B. Client-side mechanisms
Many password managers, for example, those proposed by Ross et al. [23] , [13] and Haldermann et al. [23] , [13] , apply collision resistant hash functions to various combinations of a user password, user name, site name and a random nonce. A usual assumption is that the hash function is slow enough so that an exhaustive search for the password is infeasible. However, this type of protection requires that passwords are long enough to withstand exhaustive search and that the hash function is regularly updated to reflect advances in algorithms and processor speed. KYO, on the other hand, is designed to be resistant against computationally unbounded adversaries. Assume, for comparison, that calculating a secret takes 1 second on commodity hardware on a single CPU core and further assume that KYO is configured to use 25 bit long random passwords. Since exhaustive searches are trivially parallelized, an eight-core CPU would take at most 48 days to find the password. KYO, on the other hand, remains secure.
Several works propose means to harden password managers against risks such as a client breach. Perhaps the most prominent work is Kamouflage due to Bojinov et al. [4] . The authors pointed out that most password manager implementations could be brute-forced. They improved upon the password manager concept by introducing decoy databases so that an adversary cannot decide which database holds the correct password for a given service and needs to guess randomly. Failure to guess correctly would eventually cause the attacked account being locked, for example, based on a three-strikes rule. The benefits come at a cost, though. Bojinov et al. recommend 10 5 databases per user as a working configuration. Furthermore, the way in which databases are populated is quite involved because, again, decoys must be generated so that the adversary cannot easily tell them apart from real passwords.
iMobileSitter [12] is a password manager for smartphones. It accepts any master password that is input and, if the master password is false, decrypts its secrets erroneously but plausiblylooking. For example, a four digit PIN is always decrypted into a (different) four digit PIN. In order to hint at incorrect master passwords, it displays an iconic image along with retrieved secrets and expects that the user recognizes that a wrong image is displayed along with a falsely decrypted secret. By virtue of being a password manager rather than a password generator, iMobileSitter is susceptible to known-plaintext or plausible plaintext attacks on the master password. In particular if the secrets have hidden structure, for example, secret strings in l33t sp34k, this can be leveraged in a brute-force attack on the master password. This also means that iMobileSitter is not robust against server breaches, which yield known plaintexts.
Additional approaches to hardening secret key encryption use bits of information of a users's personal life in order to encrypt the secret key [8] , they use multiple low entropy passwords in order to generate a high entropy password [11] or they leverage secure personal devices for password recovery [20] .
On the input error side, there is password-corrective hashing [21] . In this approach hash functions map similar passwords to the same output, for example, passwords that differ with respect to character transpositions and substitutions. In contrast to our work, password-corrective hashing does not take password sharing into account. Furthermore, a variety of factors may influence the input errors users make, for example, the keyboard layout and the input method [24] . In particular, soft keyboards on mobile phones were shown to yield different input error rates. We believe it likely that different layouts also have an influence on the types of errors. Password corrective hashing would have to account for all conceivable influences, particularly if passwords are meant to be shared among different devices.
C. Related work summary
In summary, while it may appear that KYO uses elements that have been published prior, none of the cited works and no existing password management solution of which we are aware offers the combination of benefits that KYO offers while KYO suffers from none of the limits and downsides that existing approaches have. Some properties of KYO make it quite unique and an interesting subject for further study. In particular, KYO demonstrates that surprisingly short passwords can offer a high level of security against unbounded attackers while protecting against client and multiple server breaches. Second, KYO demonstrates that fast non-cryptographic hash functions have compelling security applications, particularly hash functions for which pre-images can be enumerated efficiently.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented KYO, our client-side password generator. KYO is easy to implement, efficient to operate and provides a unique set of benefits that set it apart from the related work of which we are aware. KYO offers short passwords, security against unbounded adversaries and against client and multiple server breaches while being backwards-compatible and flexible at the same time. The feature that we find most compelling is KYO's use of non-cryptographic hash functions. KYO does not rely on collision-resistance and rather benefits from hash functions that enable efficient enumeration and intersection of pre-image sets. We analyzed KYO mathematically and empirically in order to provide evidence of its security, safety and performance. However, its empirical analysis could be pushed to larger security parameters if more beneficial hash functions can be identified. This might also enable a user to test for her choices of passwords what the concrete security is that they provide, rather than relying on average case guarantees, as is common in many areas of cryptography.
APPENDIX
Before we start we recapitulate a well-known lemma that we use throughout our proofs.
Lemma A1 (Number of functions). Let X 1 , X 2 be non-empty and disjoint sets and Y 1 , Y 2 non-empty sets. Set X := ∪ i X i , Y := ∪ i Y i , and
KYO properties:
Lemma A2. Let σ be a seed and γ a digest. Then the size of F −1 σ (γ) is binomial distributed with average value 2 n− .
Proof: For a password ρ, what is the probability that it is mapped to γ? There are in total (2 ) 2 n −1 functions that do map a given ρ to a given γ. So the probability to select such a function is
We now get for the number of passwords that map to γ i
Lemma 1 (Password creation). If the password table PW already contains N passwords, the number of random tries to find the (N + 1)-th password is geometric distributed with average value
, what is the size of
− . So we get on average
So the probability to successfully pick a suiting password at random is
The number of random tries to find one password is then given by the geometric distribution with probability p, and its expected value is 1/p.
Lemma A3. Given a password ρ and secret γ, the number of random tries to find a seed σ that satisfies F σi (ρ) = γ is geometric distributed with average value 2 .
Proof: The probability to pick such a function in one try is 2 − . Let X be a random variable that denotes the number of tries until one is found. Then X is geometric distributed:
The expected value of X is 2 − , so one must test 2 different seeds on average to find one such seed.
Lemma 2 (Seed selection 1). For given N − 1 passwords, a randomly chosen seed σ fulfils requirement 2 with probability (1 − 2 − ) N −1 .
Proof: We count the number of functions that do not map the passwords ρ 1 , . . . , ρ N −1 to an arbitrary but fixed digest. From lemma A1 follows that there are Lemma 3 (Seed selection). Given a password ρ and shared secrets γ 1 , . . . , γ N , the number of random tries to find seeds σ 1 , . . . , σ N that satisfy F σi (ρ) = γ i is geometric distributed with average value N · 2 .
Proof: Follows by N repetitions from Lemma A3 .
Safety:
Lemma 4 (Safety). Let N be the number of pairwise distinct wrongly entered passwords and let N be small compared to 2 s . Then the safety of the KYO scheme is binomial distributed with average value
Proof: Let γ be the stored digest. There are (2 − 1) N ·
2 n −N functions that do not map the passwords ρ i to the digest γ. We now find, that
If N is small compared to 2 s , we can approximate this experiment by drawing from an urn with replacement. The probability is then binomial distributed with the average value above.
Security:
Lemma 5 (Guessing secrets). Let C be a set of equally likely candidate passwords and c := |C|. We define M := F σ (C). Then the probability
for every γ ∈ M .
Proof: In this proof, we consider F to be a random function. Note that this does not contradict our definition of KYO families, but instead provides an easier proof. We model this situation by drawing balls from an urn with 2 different colored balls for c times.
For each secret γ, the probability that it is mapped onto by at least one password in C is 1 − (1 − 2 − ) c . So the size of M is binomial distributed with average value 2 · (1 − (1 − 2 − ) c ).
Let X denote a random variable that gives the number of passwords that map to a given digest. Since F is a random function, X too will be binomial distributed with average value c · 2 − . So on average, each digest γ ∈ M will be equally likely with probability 1/c. Lemma 6. The size of M is binomial distributed with average value 2 n−N · .
Proof: For a password ρ, what is the probability that it is mapped to γ i ? There are in total (2 ) 2 n −1 functions that do map a given ρ to a given γ i . If the σ i are selected uniformly at random and independent from each other, we get 
Theorem 1 (Guessing passwords). It is
with the size of M being binomial distributed with average value 2 n−N l .
Proof: For any ρ i ∈ M , we get using Bayes' theorem
, which simplifies to
since all passwords are initially equally likely and the terms
are all equal, given that (F σ ) σ∈S covers all functions mapping P to L. The result follows now from Lemma 6.
